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“The damned word:” Culture and Its (In)compatibility with Law 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
The compatibility and incompatibility between law and culture are identified 
through an analysis of relation. By way of exploring the elusiveness of 
conceptions of culture and of law, a commonality relating them is arrived at, one 
that indicates not only what they constituently share but also what distinguishes 
them from each other. So far an abstract abstract. The abstractness of the 
comment itself is relieved by references to a case study and by resorting to 
etymologies.  
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The damned word:” Culture and Its (In)compatibility with Law 
 
 Why should it still be a question? Why should it still be pertinent to ask 
impertinently “what does culture have to do with it?” (I will presume “it” to be 
the relation between law and culture)? Now that there is an abundant observation 
of compatibility between law and culture, and of each manifesting itself in the 
other, surely we could expect to come upon a well-settled scene. Yet, as the edgy 
quality of the question might suggest, the relation of law to culture remains 
“disputed” and “uneasy.”1 What is more, no matter how often culture is shown to 
inhabit law, this is still some kind of revelation. Culture has now joined society, 
class, gender, and the state of the judge’s digestion as things on which law is 
thoroughly reliant, and it is this reliance which is continually revealed, and 
revealed in a way which confronts law’s pretence to be otherwise. The sustaining 
of that pretence is some testament to law’s insistent autonomy, as is the fact that 
culture has of late joined society, and various other things, not only as making or 
shaping law but also as being made or shaped by it. This mantric alternation 
leaves law and culture in a relational soup in which neither need assume 
distinctness. Law, in sum, is dependent on culture (or society and so on), yet it 
exists autonomously and affects culture (or society and so on). This is one 
conundrum that the present comment attempts to resolve. 
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 With an apt perversity, resolution will proceed by way of irresolution. The 
other, and unavoidable, conundrum involved in dealing with the ever unsettled 
relation between law and culture is the spectacular intractability of the things to 
be related. What law and culture do share is a notorious resistance to the 
metaphysics of presence, to being rendered in terms of some generally accepted 
content. Staying for now with culture and with the brief to “interrogate” it, what is 
remarkable is that under interrogation culture never breaks down. It can never be 
reductively rendered but always retains its existential secret.  So, to take a 
notorious example, even with Kroeber and Kluckhohn’s 164 anthropological 
definitions, ‘culture’ somehow still manages to escape.2 Which goes to account 
for some of the exasperation of Raymond Williams when declaiming of culture 
that “I don’t know how many times I’ve wished that I’d never heard the damned 
word.”3 Williams could, however, be taken at his word in the derivation of 
‘damned’ from damnum as loss. Culture is damned in that the possibility in its 
being, the infinite incipience of its existent contents, is always lost in any 
instantiation of it. That loss is intensified in the necessity of instantiation, in the 
inability of culture to be rendered fully. And although that is a loss attending any 
signification, culture seems to be a concept enabling some experiential, even 
cognitive hold on the loss itself, a concept conveying some surpassing of the 
inexorability of presence. What Bagehot says of nation can perhaps be said of 
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culture also: “We know what it is when you do not ask us, but we cannot very 
quickly explain or define it.”4   
 To begin to get a hold on this hold that culture seems to have, a case study 
may help. From it I will derive two dimensions of culture, dimensions that would 
seem to mark a pervasive and persistent divide found in accounts of culture. I will 
then elaborate on those dimensions and on how they are brought together in the 
constituting of culture. The case study chosen is Gerd Baumann’s intense 
observation of the diversity of cultures and his “contesting culture”, the idea of 
culture, in “multi-ethnic London.”5 When dealing with “the dominant discourse” 
and its penetrative efficacy, Baumann finds that “culture” imports contained 
presence as “cultural differences,” as something “reified,” as a surrogate racial 
ascription.6 Yet when looking at the diversity of cultures in play, Baumann joins a 
great many others in finding the reified notion of culture quite wanting. Culture, 
rather, is something “dynamic,” a “continual process,” uncontainable and resistant 
to reification.7 Yet there is nothing in that perception of culture as mere 
movement that would leave it with any determinate existence at all. Baumann 
does, however, advance matters beyond this common and inherently incomplete 
line of criticism. He observes that the confining categories in which culture is 
reified are categories actually accepted and generated by the very people to whom 
they are applied; but these categories are not solely those of a dominant culture. 
Rather, he finds that these same people juggle many different cultures and 
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consciously “reify culture at the same time as making, re-making, and thus 
changing it.”8  Culture is here being recognised simultaneously, “at the same 
time,” as some-thing and as other than that thing. These dimensions of culture 
running through a welter of its meanings will now be briefly considered, starting 
with the reified variety.  
Derrida’s remarking on “a coloniality of culture” has an appropriate touch 
of the tautology to it.9 ‘Culture’ denotes the cultivated, and thence demarcated 
field, and “colonial” is derived from colere, to till. Culture in this demarcating 
dimension enables a group or an institution to endow meaning on a self-
appropriative existence, thus enabling it, in Kuper’s terms, to be “marked off from 
all others.”10 A stark example would be, borrowing Stolcke’s designation, the 
cultural fundamentalism espoused by elements of the political right in Europe.11 
With such fundamentalism, people are perceived as constituted essentially by 
their distinct culture. That culture, in turn, is perceived as geographically 
confined, and the various cultures involved are taken to be incommensurable and 
conflicting. Gilroy accurately sees this as a neo-racism,12 but the assertion of self-
containment and the sharpness of division characterising European cultural 
fundamentalism can be found also in manifestations of culture of a more 
progressive pedigree, such as multiculturalism and cultural relativism.  
 This type of positioning in relation to culture is, I now hope to show, 
unrealizable but, as I also hope to show soon after, that failure of realization does 
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reveal constituents of cultural being. Taking cultural fundamentalism as the 
exemplar, to be coherent in its own perspective, the nostrums of cultural 
fundamentalism can only be of a culture. Being bounded by our distinct culture, 
we cannot know that we know or do not know other cultures, and hence we 
cannot know that other cultures and our own are utterly distinct, 
incommensurable, and inevitably conflicting. Bluntly, the very claim to separation 
not only fails to counter the possibility of relation but in itself evokes that 
possibility. 
 And, indeed, neither cultural fundamentalism nor those other claims to 
cultural separation would deny that the cultures concerned are somehow in a 
relation. This very recognition of some relation, however, poses insuperable 
difficulties for the distinctness of such a culture – the distinctness maintained in 
the relation. If each culture is going to claim distinctness as completeness yet be-
with other cultures, if it is going to assume an element of commonality necessary 
for relation yet still be so distinct, each culture in the relation would then have to 
be the same as the other. There is simply no other way, no other condition short of 
sameness, through which they can relate. Distinctness would thence be lost. 
Alternatively, if this distinctness of each is to be preserved, there would be as 
many different claims on what is in common as there are distinctly different 
cultures in relation. This would be the utter dissipation of commonality. Hence 
my key point: the seemingly paradoxical price of the distinctness of a culture in 
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its relation to other cultures is some being-in-common inhabiting and limiting 
each culture ‘in’ its very distinctness. I will return shortly to the point and relate it 
to the constitution of cultural being. 
 Before that, and not least because the exercise may confirm this key point, 
there should be some consideration of those significant variations on cultures as 
distinct that would nonetheless see them as integrally related. Cultures are found 
to so relate “in contexts of hybridity, creolisation, intermixture.”13 Or, cultures are 
“overlapping, interactive…;” they are “densely interdependent in their formation 
and identity.”14 Or, specifically, multiculturalism is saved from mere difference 
through “relationality” between cultures.15 Yet, important as these constituent 
claims for cultures in relation have been, they all fail through their inability to 
mark any such culture as distinct, to save it from being lost in the relation, or to 
show that some tertium quid does not utterly subordinate the cultures in relation. 
Indeed, a tertium quid is posited at least as the position from which claims to 
distinctness and relation have to be made for, borrowing from Davidson, to say 
that cultures are distinct yet in relation would “make sense…only if there is a 
common coordinate system on which to plot them; yet the existence of a common 
system belies the claim to dramatic incomparability.”16 Thus we arrive at a 
conclusion bolstering that just reached when considering claims to such “dramatic 
incomparability,” the conclusion which arrived at a being-in-common as a 
condition of the (element of) incomparability. In all, and in terms of the first 
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dimension derived from Baumann’s case, culture resists  reification; it fails to be 
simply some distinct thing.  
Before moving on to derive an idea of cultural being from this productive 
failure, and as a necessary prelude to so doing, some account has to be taken of 
the other dimension of culture derived from Baumann’s case. If culture cannot be 
some distinct thing, neither can it, in terms of the second dimension, exist simply 
as other than that thing. Admittedly, culture can manifest an exuberant ability to 
extend in a receptive and protean way beyond itself, beyond what it may at any 
one time be. This ability is reflected in such characteristic descriptions of culture 
as “open, syncretic, and unstable.”17 Something of that quality is captured also in 
the frequent rendering of culture as process: “Culture in all its early uses was a 
noun of process,” says Williams.18 That this processual, open dimension of 
culture cannot be existently contained is evident from the failure of efforts to 
encompass it in a totality of ‘culture’ as some abstract or universal entity. These 
efforts are usually located in the Enlightenment departure from the “early uses” 
noted by Williams, and the most potent of these departures has involved the 
transformation of ‘culture’ into‘civilization.’19 The idea of civilization soon 
comes to reinforce its arrogation of the cultural universal by fusing with the belief 
that culture distinguishes human life – culture as an ability to work on and against 
nature, including our savage human nature.20 Much more recently, the 
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uncontainable ‘in’ culture is putatively emplaced in quasi-universal notions of 
world culture and of global culture.21  
But where may we stand apart from universal civilization, the human, the 
global, the world, life, so as to get a perspective on any of these? Two types of 
quasi-constituent claim are advanced in answer, one positive and one negative. 
The positive takes the form of the exemplar in which positioned particularity 
enshrines the universal, most commonly a singular people asserting a prerogative 
hold on civilization. Since it affects only those subscribing to it as a transcendent 
belief, the hold of exemplarity cannot be universal short of its comprehensive 
acceptance. The negative claim could be seen as something of an elaboration on 
culture’s “always [being] defined in opposition to something else.”22 The 
civilized, staying with the example of civilization, constituently opposes the 
savage. With this expedient, the supposed universal can never be such since it 
lacks universal reach in its dependence on what is ever beyond it. Yet, as 
universal, it must professedly seek to include that which it opposes, as in varieties 
of social evolution. But the constituent opposition can never be finally eliminated 
because the claim to the universal depends essentially on it.23  However, that very 
ability of a culture to embed the universal for its adherents is testament to this 
‘universal’ being more than mere failure. What that ‘more’ entails is a culture’s 
universal orientation, its extending incipiently and uncontainedly beyond any 
existent particular. 
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 It is time to draw in this engagement with constituent dimensions of 
culture and to derive from it what culture ‘is’ before proceeding to indicate “what 
culture has to do with it,” to do with the relation between law and culture. This 
drawing-in will for now focus on and extend the key point emphasised when 
considering cultures in relation, the point being that the very distinctness in the 
relation of such cultures depended on some being-in-common inhabiting and 
limiting each. Although the point was derived from cultures relating to each other, 
it would emerge by way of the same analysis from any relation that is an 
interrelation, a mutual being-with. What I hope to show now is that culture, as 
well as a culture, is itself such a being-in-common and to show this not just as a 
dry analytical matter but as avidly existent. 
 Which is where this anfractuous adventure began, and it is in this 
beginning that it has remained. People in London’s Southall who provided 
Baumann’s case “reify culture at the same time as making, remaking, and thus 
changing it.”24 Culture and a culture combine being reified, being rendered 
determinate, and being responsively and illimitably other to that determinate 
existence. These dimensions of culture are, in turn, constituents of interrelation 
and its condign being-in-common. That being-in-common has to be capable of 
determinate effects if, in terms of my key point, it is to limit the relating entities 
‘in’ their very distinctness. As determinate and thence partial or incomplete, it 
must ever relate responsively beyond what is its determinate existence at any one 
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time. Put another way, the dimension of responsiveness could only be, as it were, 
displaced in a totality absorbing all (of what would otherwise be) alterity, and 
thence denying the possibility of, and the possibility in, relation. And the two 
dimensions are integral to each other. Short of the determinate, in turn, being an 
all-absorbing totality, the dimension of the determinate cannot enduringly exist 
without its relating-beyond. And this relating-beyond cannot come into existence, 
cannot be a bringing into existence, without the receptively determinate. 
 Culture is the combination and the combining of these dimensions in a 
way that generates shared meaning. It is, again drawing on Baumann, an “ever-
changing ‘complex whole’…through which people engage in the continual 
process of accounting, in a mutually meaningful manner, for what they do, say, 
and might think.”25 Something of this quality of culture, the quality of extending 
ever beyond in the finding of meaning and thence bringing it back to an existent 
place, could be summarily accentuated in the frequent evocation of culture as 
being of, or somehow matching, the sacred or the religious.26 The etymology 
remains accommodating: colere is not just to till but also to worship. 
 With that obliging etymology as a springboard, my focus will shift to what 
was taken to be the exordial “it” in the question “What does culture have to do 
with it?” – shift in other words to the relation between law and culture. “Relation” 
in this initial formulation now loses its blandness and becomes pointedly 
challenging. If the key point about distinctness in relation is to hold here, then 
 11
there has to be a shared being-in-common as between law and culture, and that 
being-in-common has to foment the distinctness of each in the relation. 
Back to etymology, now in the company of Vissman:  
 
The primordial scene of the nomos opens with a drawing of a line 
in the soil. This very act initiates a specific concept of law, which 
derives order from the notion of space. The plough draws lines – 
furrows in the field – to mark the space of one’s own. As such, as 
ownership, the demarcating plough touches the juridical sphere. 
…The primordial act as described here brings together land and 
law, cultivation and order, space and nomos.27  
 
Or with Young: this “is the original meaning of nomos, that portion of food-
bearing land (we still call it ‘keep’) through which my sheep may safely graze.”28 
And the ever-obliging colere would also mean to care for and to protect. All of 
that may sit comfortably with standard notions of law as containedly determinate, 
but there is more to it. Young would add: 
 
With a supremely judicious sense of metaphor, the Greeks also 
used ‘nomos’ to designate song or melody, that portion of 
structured time through which my emotions (and perhaps my 
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dancing body) may safely range in search of nourishment without 
fear of being ecstatically carried away.29
 
Yet even that ranging beyond is too restrained, and restraining, for law. With 
Foucault now, we could ask: 
 
How could one know the law and truly experience it, how could 
one force it to come into view, to exercise its powers clearly, to 
speak, without provoking it, without pursuing it into its recesses, 
without resolutely going ever farther into the outside into which it 
is always receding?30
 
And with Blanchot we may: 
 
…grant that the law is obsessed with exteriority, by that which 
beleaguers it and from which it separates via the very separation 
that institutes it as form, in the very movement by which it 
formulates this exteriority as law.31
 
 Matching these extravagant claims now with the dimensions already 
identified in culture, it could be said that law ‘is’ the settlement in terms of a 
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normative continuity of the existential divide between a determinate positioning 
and a responding to what is beyond position, and it is in the necessity yet 
impossibility of such settlement that law is iteratively impelled into existence. In 
their separation yet inexorable combining, these two dimensions form the horizon 
of law, a moving horizon – the horizon both as a condition and quality of law’s 
contained existence, and the horizon as opening onto all that lies beyond this 
existence. Law’s position within that horizon cannot be at all irenically set. The 
assertion of determinate position has always to be made in relation to the 
infinitely responsive. To give emphasis to this responsive dimension of law is to 
go against the epochal elevation of occidental law’s determinate dimension over 
the responsive. Yet this emphasis is hardly to deny that, if law continually 
becomes itself and is sustained in its responsiveness to exteriority, there must 
nonetheless be a positioned place where this responsiveness can be made 
determinate. That which is purely beyond is merely inaccessible,and out of 
responsive range. Law always returns to determinate position, and to sustain 
position there must be some shielding from an importunate responsiveness. There 
has, with any law, to be a constant, reductive effort to ensure that “the aleatory 
margin…remains homogeneous with calculation, within the order of the 
calculable.”32 Yet, further, law has also to exceed all fixity of determination. It 
remains pervaded by the relation to what is beyond, labile and protean to an 
illimitable extent. This impossibility of invariant positioning is what makes law 
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possible. Even at its most settled, or especially at its most settled, law could not 
‘be’ otherwise than in a responsiveness to what was beyond its determinate 
content ‘for the time being’. If that content could be perfectly stilled, there could 
be no call for decision, for determination, for law. And it is in the very response to 
this call, in the making and sustaining of its distinct content, that law ‘finds itself’ 
integrally tied to, and incipiently encompassing of, its exteriority.  
 It is in their combining of these dimensions that law and culture each 
enables, and gives experiential purchase on, being-in-common. In so doing, law 
and culture join a set of elusive entities which even, or especially, in modernity 
assume the sacral capacity of bringing an illimitable reach into some determinate 
rendering. And from the ‘profane’ perspective of that rendering, these entities 
assume a self-subsistent, if necessarily imprecise, presence along with an 
incorporative extension beyond that presence – such as, to take almost random 
instances, the denizens of Schmitt’s “political theology,” or of Lefort’s 
“ideology,” or Derrida’s accounting for sovereignty as “a secularized theological 
concept.”33 There is, there has to be, a quotidian quality, an ordinariness to these 
extraordinary entities. The residents of Southall can readily inhabit and use the 
entity Baumann studied, culture. And it is manifest and it is commonplace, in 
processes of legal decision-making and in the claims which law’s adherents make 
on one another, that law is determinately graspable and yet responsively receptive 
to changing social conditions and such.  
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 So much for the compound being-in-common inhabiting law and culture, 
but if the key point is to survive this instance of it, the being-in-common must not 
only inhabit but also limit each entity and somehow do so ‘in’ its very 
distinctness. As between law and culture, that limit subsists in the different terms 
in which each combines the two dimensions. With culture they combine in a way 
that is necessarily unresolved, with law necessarily resolved. 
 Returning one further time to Baumann’s Southall, as we have seen, its 
people can treat culture simultaneously as reified and as in the process of being 
other to its reification. For them to be able to do this, there has to be a constituent 
irresolution with-in culture as between these two dimensions of it, as between 
what has been called here the determinate and the responsive. If it were otherwise, 
if there were an enduring resolution as between the two dimensions, either the 
responsive would be contained in the determinate or the determinate would be lost 
in the responsive. True, academies and canonical fiats do attempt some 
prescriptive resolution, but this can only ever have tangential influence on the life 
of culture. To assert a culture as comprehensively determinate, and where the 
assertion is not simply descriptive, is invariably to assert some entitlement or right 
as a culture, and that would be “to present ourselves as bounded beings – distinct, 
recognizable, delineated, subjects before the law.”34  
 And as for the resolving law, if the account of it offered a short while ago 
is accepted, then it could be said that law entails the illimitable yet determinative 
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bringing of what is beyond into the normatively determinate. So as to be 
intrinsically resolving and yet embody such an insistent receptivity, law is 
intrinsically unattached to any pre-existent. Thence law “affirms itself as law and 
without reference to anything higher: to it alone, pure transcendence.”35 Law, 
then, has to stand “absolute and detached from any origin” anterior to itself.36 It 
has to stand apart from the incessant demands of society, culture, history, and so 
on – from the demands even of its “own history.”37 Yet, if law must refuse any 
such attachment and be utterly responsive, if it thence becomes a vacuity, 
dependent and derivative and quite lacking in any content of its own, there is 
inexorable point to the observation of law’s dependence on society, culture, 
history, and so on. How, indeed, could law’s contents have specific meaning 
without the contribution of culture as the generator of specific meaning? More 
intimately, how could there be an “internalizing of the law” on the part of its 
subjects, or how could it “regulate them from the inside,” without the unsurpassed 
adroitness of “artistic culture” in its “mapping the complexities of the heart?”38  
 It must follow, however, that with law’s refusal of any primal attachment, 
this taking on of meaning has always to be mediated through law itself. No matter 
how seemingly abject law’s cultural borrowings, law will endow them with its 
own meanings and create what is readily called a “legal culture.”39 These 
meanings will often differ markedly from the cultures contributing them.40 Also, 
law will not simply absorb and recreate a culture but will, as the terminology has 
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it, reflect many cultures, and even where, as it often must, law determinately 
elevates one culture over another, this is not to exclude the other finally, much 
less to elevate the included pervasively.  
 This self-determining constitution of law still leaves it a seeming vacuity. 
If it must determine its own content, law cannot rely ultimately for content on 
what is outside of it. This is monumentally attested to by the long failure of 
jurisprudential effort to render law as society or fact. Nor, however, can law 
generate assured content internally for, as we have just seen, the very process of 
iterable determination in law affirmatively imports into it a responsive and 
receptive regard for what is ever beyond. Law’s content, then, is evanescent, and 
it is recognized as such. In all, law would indeed seem to be left a vacuity and, 
specifically, left without the means of taking on any distinctness in its relation to 
culture. The outcome would seem to be that my key point and along with it the 
relational analysis that was the present comment both crumble. Something, 
obviously, must be done to save them. 
 What, as it were, produces law’s vacuity is its intrinsically incorporative 
regard for what is ever beyond. This does not, or does not just, involve a denial of 
determinate content but involves, rather, the responsive opening of that content to 
the possibility of being otherwise, to becoming an effect of this possibility. Law 
subsists, then, as the resolving in-between this determinately realized and the 
ultimately unrealizable possibility beyond. 
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 To lend plausibility to this positioning of law, I will now touch on certain 
qualities commonly found in law or in legal culture. Starting with equality before 
the law, in its determinate existence, law is characterized by differentiation and 
inequality. Hence, perhaps, equality before the law is often described as a value or 
as an ideal. But it is both less and more than these things. It is less in not being 
some replete ethical standard, and it is more in not simply being required or 
desired. It does seem to make sense to say that there is equality before the law. 
This is so, I would suggest, because the determinate in law, with all its 
differentiations and inequalities, is always opening to, or falling into, the 
possibility of being otherwise – the possibility of its being without differentiation 
and inequality. Of course, it can never existently be that since, with the return to 
the determinate, differentiation and inequality will always supervene. Yet the 
possibility of equality remains anterior to law iterably made determinant, and the 
incipience of equality remains within that law. So positioned, equality before the 
law is a “manner of being” in law.41 As such, it has generated a host of operative 
requirements to do with parity in the processes and outcomes of legal 
determination. 
 Using that engagement with equality before the law as a template, other 
and not unconnected qualities of law and legal culture can now be considered 
more briefly. Taking impartiality first: law’s lack of containing ties to the existent 
orients law towards an absence of attachment in its ‘application.’ Yet, what is, in 
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Locke’s terms,42 law’s being needful of “a known and indifferent Judge” is not 
finally feasible since the indifference becomes inexorably compromised when 
judge and judgement are made known in the determinate scene of application. 
This inevitable diminishing, however, does not counter the integrity of the quality 
of impartiality. This much can be discerned negatively in that it would not be an 
answer to a failure of impartiality to say that one was impartial in part. 
 Then there is the requirement that laws be general. Because of this 
requirement, it used often to be said that a decision confined to a specific 
determination does not count as law.43 Yet, if the general cannot find itself in that 
determinate existence of law which would result from a specific determination, it 
cannot be so general that it adheres to nothing specific and has no operative 
content. Hence the common and paradoxical requirement that law’s “generality 
must be specific”.44 The ‘place’ where that paradoxical generality is found is in 
law’s normative quality, and this is my final example. The juridical norm will 
have some specificity of content but its content is ever-extensively general; it 
cannot be exhausted or foreclosed in specific applications, no matter how 
numerous. Yet the norm cannot be ungraspable either. It has to carry obligation 
and, in specific cases, carry the decision. Going over to the side of the angels, it 
can be said that norms must be capable of maintaining an “internal aspect” so that 
people may use them “in one situation after another, as guides to the conduct of 
social life, as the basis for claims, demands, admissions, criticism or punishment, 
 20
viz., in all the familiar transactions of life according to rules.”45 It is in this 
infinitely participatory “manner of being” that “legal culture” has been cogently 
observed.46 We could all be gods now. 
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